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Unlike previous studies focusing on either market structure or gender earning gap 
separately, this study considers market structure as a more crucial factor in 
determining the gender earning gap. The estimated wage differentials between 
sectors from the fixed-effects model demonstrate a substantial drop in the size of 
wage gaps, reflecting systematic sorting between formal and informal sectors by 
unobserved workers’ abilities. While estimated wage differentials from cross-
sectional analysis between formal and informal sector among male workers 
disappear in the fixed-effect estimations, the wage gap between the formal and 
informal sector among female workers still exists in the fixed effect estimation, 
thus suggesting a differing dual labor market severity between gender groups. 
Based on these empirical results, we discuss a policy direction involving 
simultaneous consideration of the dual structure of the labor market and gender 
discrimination.  
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This paper explores the research question of how the structure of labor market affects the 
gender earning gap. The informal sector has been broadly defined to include such factors 
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as coverage of the social security system, tax payment, firm size, formal contract, etc.1  In 
our definition of the informal sector, we utilized the prevailing criterion for the 
formal/informal labor market, specifically whether workers are being covered by a social 
security system. 
Indeed, the structure of the formal and informal labor market is related closely to 
gender groups in the labor market. Female workers in the informal market frequently find 
themselves employed in low-paying jobs with poor working conditions and limited 
opportunities to advance in the formal labor market. 2  Furthermore, the employment 
distributions of men and women frequently differ in the formal and informal labor 
markets. Men often dominate the formal market, whereas many female-concentrated jobs 
are relatively distributed in the informal market. Although characteristics of dualism in 
the labor market are found for both male and female workers, the severity of dualism may 
differ among gender groups. In fact, our study interestingly finds out that the wage 
differential between the formal and informal sector found among female workers does 
not appear in the group of male workers. Based on this empirical result, our study 
speculates that the dual labor market structure aggravates the overall gender earning gap, 
                                                 
1 For example, Yamada (1996) declares workers to belong to the informal sector so long as they 
are not subject to taxes or government regulation, and as long as the employer can easily 
change both the employees’ wages and the employment contract. Marcouiller et al. (1997) 
focuses on two aspects--firm size and coverage of the social security system. They define 
workers as being in the informal sector if the firm size is quite small (employees are less 
than 5 or so) or if workers do not receive social security benefits as an employment 
condition. Savvedra and Chong (1999) employ a broader definition of the informal sector 
as including several criteria--including formal contracts, health insurance and pension 
coverage, and tax payments.   
2 The lack of governmental institutional support for women in having and raising children or 
gender discriminatory work practices makes it difficult for women whose careers have been 
interrupted to return to their previous formal sector jobs. As a consequence, they are 
frequently compelled to settle in the informal market (Cho and Kwon 2010, Cho, Kwon 
and Ahn 2010). 
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as female workers are penalized more by locating themselves in the informal labor 
market than are male workers.  
In an effort to tackle this research question, we utilize Korean data for two 
reasons. The first is that the Korean labor market prominently features duality of formal 
and informal labor markets (Cho 2004, Cho and Cho, 2010 Cho and Keum 2009). The 
second reason is that the gender earning gap in Korea tends to be huge relative to other 
OECD countries.3   
Previous studies have considered the wage gap in the formal and informal labor 
market or the gender earning gap from a separated perspective. For example, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the wage gap in the dual labor market were initially 
researched by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Dickens and Lang (1985). A vast array of 
empirical studies into the dual labor market followed, many of which concerned 
themselves with measuring the degree of duality in various countries (Cameron, Dowling, 
and Worswick 2001, Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff 1997, Theisen 2005, 
Yuki 2007). On the other hand, research for the gender earning gap has also proliferated. 
For instance, Blau and Khan (1996) measured the gender earning gap for 10 OECD 
countries and Arulampalam et al. (2007) updated the estimates for the gender earning gap 
for EU countries. However, these previous studies tend to pay less attention to the 
possibility that the market structure of dualism may interact in some way with the gender 
earning gap.  
Unlike previous studies focusing on either the market structure or the gender 
earning gap separately, a few studies have adopted a sectoral approach in analyzing the 
                                                 
3 The gender earnings gap in the Korean labor market is approximately 35%, indicating a huge 
gender gap relative to the fact that the gender earnings gap is approximately 20% in most 
OECD nations (OECD 2008). 
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gender earning gap. For instance, Cho, Cho, and Song (2010) considered differences in 
the gender earning gap between the public and private sectors both in the US and Korea, 
discovering that the lowest gender earnings gap was found in the Korean public sector. 
On the other hand, Cho and Cho (2010) consider the differences in the gender earning 
gap in the unionized and non-unionized sector for Korea. To extend these sectoral 
approaches to the issue of the gender earning gap, this study formally takes a market 
structure into account as a more crucial factor in determining the gender earning gap. In 
an effort to determine how the structure of the labor market affects the gender earning 
gap, this study incorporates two sector models of the formal and informal labor market, 
and estimates the wage differential in each labor market from the perspective of the 
gender groups. 
One innovative element that differentiates this research from previous studies lies 
in the type of data and econometric methodology employed. Our research utilizing panel 
data analyzes the wage difference between the formal and informal sector using fixed-
effects (FE) models which allow us to overcome possible endogenous problems 
associated with cross-sectional analysis.  
Section 2 explains the empirical methodology and section 3 elucidates the 
analyzed data and the characteristics of the workers in the formal and informal labor 
markets in Korea are outlined. Section 4 presents the main results generated from the 
fixed effect model using the panel data and compares them with results from the cross-
sectional estimation. A dual labor market theory is put forth in order to interpret the 
empirical results. The concluding remarks for summary and policy direction are stated in 
the final section 5.  
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2. Empirical methodology 
 
One important element that differentiates our research from previous studies lies in the 
econometric methodology used. The majority of the previous research tends to utilize 
cross-sectional data.  However, the inevitable bias in the estimated coefficients comes 
from the possible correlation between unobserved individuals’ characteristics and their 
decision as to which jobs to take. In order to overcome the possible endogenous problems 
associated with cross-sectional analysis, some studies have employed a two-step 
estimation method, in which they come up with the instrumental variable identifying the 
formal and informal sector decision of workers (e.g. Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla, and 
Woodruff 1997). It is, however, always difficult to find ‘satisfactory’ excluded variables 
that should affect only workers’ sectoral choices, and not workers’ wage levels. Using 
available Korean panel data, this research seeks to analyze the wage difference between 
the formal and informal sector, as the fixed-effects models are widely known to control 
the correlation between the workers’ unobserved characteristics and their sectoral 
decisions. 
So far many studies have been conducted on measures of the informal sector 
wage gap across countries using different methodologies. The OLS estimation by simply 
inserting a dummy variable indicating whether an individual works in the informal sector 
can be written as follows: 
                                    ln Wit =  Xit β  + Ztγ  + Iijtδ  + iμ  + itε                                          (1) 
where ln Wit is the log real hourly earnings for individual i at time t, Xit is a vector of 
individual characteristics i at time t, Zt represents year dummies, Iijt is a dummy variable 
equal to one if individual i belongs to the informal sector at time t, and itε  is an error 
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term. Here we can consider the years of education, age, tenure, industry, occupation, and 
marital status as personal characteristics that influence the level of workers’ wages. 
The iμ  represents unmeasured worker characteristics, and may be correlated with 
the measure of informal sector Iijt. If one simply estimates this wage equation by OLS, 
biased estimates of δ  will be generated unless the iμ  is unrelated to the workers’ sector 
choices. If workers with a high value of iμ (higher ability or productivity) systematically 
select the formal sector rather than the informal sector, the OLS regression will generate 
an upward bias for the estimate of jδ . In order to solve this type of endogenous problem, 
for example, Marcouiller et al. (1997) employed a two-step estimation wherein they 
accounted for the determinants of being in the informal sector.4 They concluded that the 
results from controlling for the endogenous problem do not differ significantly from the 
results generated by simple OLS estimation.  
Despite these efforts to control for unobserved worker characteristics, many 
researchers admit that it is very difficult to determine some excluded variables that 
significantly affect only inclusion in the formal sector, but not affecting the wage 
equation.5 An alternative method of controlling for the possible endogenous problem is to 
‘difference out’ unobserved individual characteristics by estimating fixed-effect models 
with panel data. Among many examples in the literature associated with fixed-effect 
estimation, Brown (1980) on wage differences and working conditions, Freeman (1984) 
on union wage premiums, and Kruger and Summers (1988) on industry wage 
                                                 
4 They use several characteristics of workers which are considered to affect whether workers are 
in the informal sector. Those include whether one is married, one is the head of the 
household, and the number of infants in the family. 
5 It is advisable to report whether the coefficients of excluded variables in the first stage equation 
are jointly significant.   
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differentials are particularly salient. However, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is 
the first attempt to consider the endogenous problem using panel data in the analysis of 
wage differences between formal and informal sectors. 
The fixed-effects estimates control for the (time-constant) unmeasured worker 
characteristics via the following transformation:  
                                           ln W
~
it =  X
~
it β  + Ztγ  + I~ijtδ  + ε~it                                         (2) 
where W
~
it  = Wit - W
_







The unobserved individual fixed effect iμ  is now differenced out in the above 
transformed equation. Therefore, the fixed effects estimates of δ  will be consistent so 
long as the error term itε  is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable across all time 
periods.6  The fixed effects estimator allows for an arbitrary correlation between iμ  and 
the explanatory variables in any time period. Because of this, any explanatory variable 
that is constant over time for individual i will be swept away by the above transformation. 
Thus, it is essential to obtain sufficient samples of workers who changed their sectors 
during the studied time period. Additionally, the recent statistical packages allow 
researchers to correct for both the heteroskedasticity and the serial correlation for the 
error terms in the fixed effects estimates. 
 
3. Data and empirical model 
                                                 
6 The fixed-effects estimates of informal sector dummies might be biased if job changes are due 
to learning by employees and/or employers in the workplace. For example, workers with 
high unmeasured ability in the informal sector gradually tend to move to the formal sector 
as their ability levels become apparent to workers and/or employers over time. This can 
also be applied to lower ability workers in the informal sector. In order to solve this sorting 
problem, Krueger and Summers (1988) use the sample of displaced workers who were 
involuntarily displaced from their previous jobs. However, we cannot rule out entirely the 
self-selection problem, as the new jobs are decided on by workers.   
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3.1. Description of the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS)  
 
The empirical analysis of wage differentials between formal and informal sectors was 
conducted using the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). This survey, 
conducted by the Korea Labor Institute, was designed to provide researchers and policy 
makers with an empirical foundation for analyzing the dynamic aspects of the Korean 
labor market. Begun in 1998, the KLIPS provides longitudinal data concerning 
representative samples of Korean individuals and the family units in which they reside. 
The KLIPS sample is an equal probability sample of households from 7 metropolitan and 
urban areas in 8 provinces.7  The original number of households sampled was 5000, and a 
total of 13,317 individuals were interviewed in 1998; more than 70 percent of the original 
samples have been included in subsequent follow-up surveys.8  The individuals in the 
sample represent a variety of industry affiliations, from manufacturing to public services. 
We used the sample of salary and wage workers taken from the KLIPS 2000 to 2006 
waves, since surveys conducted prior to 2000 do not include information as to whether 
the workers are covered by various social welfare programs.  
The KLIPS contains useful information related to wage determination, such as 
union membership and firm size, which are frequently missing in analyses of the informal 
sector wage gap. The sample is restricted to full-time (more than 35 hours of work per 
week) and non-agricultural sector workers (including both male and female), who are not 
in school. The earnings variable is hourly earnings calculated from dividing weekly 
earnings by hours worked during the week, and the earnings are deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index. If workers have several jobs in any given survey year, the main 
                                                 
7 As a result, individuals residing in rural areas are excluded from this survey. 
8 The sample retention rates of KLIPS were 88% in 1999, 81% in 2000, and 77% in 2001. The 
retention rates are stable at approximately 77% since 2001. 
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jobs, defined as jobs having the longest working hours, are only included for the analysis. 
The final analysis sample contains 18,816 observations and 5,387 individuals, giving an 
average of 3.5 observations per person.9  
The KLIPS asked the respondents whether they were covered by various social 
insurance programs such as medical, employment, and industrial accident compensation 
insurance since 1999. We define the respondents as working in the informal sector so 
long as they were not covered by any of those three social insurance programs. Among 
the three types of social security benefits, it is interesting to look at the evolution and 
coverage of the employment insurance system in the Korean labor market. The Korean 
employment insurance system is unique compared to those in other countries. It was put 
into effect on July 1st, 1995, pursuant to the official announcement of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Employment Insurance Act and the Enforcement Regulation of the 
Employment Insurance Act in April 1995 and June 1995, respectively. Having covered 
companies retaining 70 or more full-time workers, the employment insurance program 
was expanded to cover all salaried workers regardless of firm size since 1998. Unlike 
employment insurance which covers only unemployment benefits in most countries, the 
Korean employment insurance system is a more comprehensive one, which was designed 
to develop workers’ skills and job stability. In addition to unemployment insurance, the 
employment insurance program provides workers with opportunities to develop their 
skills in the workplace and actively helps workers to find new jobs during their 
unemployment time.   
 
3.2. Korean employment distribution in formal/informal labor markets 
 
                                                 
9 Workers who are observed at least twice during the time period are analyzed.  
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In our definition of the informal sector, we focus on whether workers are being covered 
by any social security system of unemployment insurance, medical insurance, and 
industrial accident insurance. 10  Table 1 shows that the 75% of Korean workers are 
covered at least by one of three social insurances. The proportions of Korean workers in 
the informal sector differ substantially between male and female workers. While among 
male workers only 18% belong to the informal sector, more than 35% of females work in 
the informal sector. Therefore, Korean female workers are less likely to be covered by 
social security than male workers.  
 
3.3. Choice of key variables in the empirical model 
 
In our paper, we decide to employ the Mincer (1974) equation, which is the most widely 
used wage equation by empirical researchers. Mincer (1974) articulates the several 
factors considered to affect workers’ wages. Those factors include educational level, age, 
job tenure, union membership, gender, and several others. The human capital theory 
predicts that as individuals accumulate higher education in school, their labor 
productivity increases and as a result, workers’ wages tend to increase as well. The age 
variable is included for similar reasons as the educational variable (Murphy and Welch 
1990).  
                                                 
10 The unemployment insurance system in Korea was first introduced in July of 1995, and was 
extended to businesses with fewer than 30 employees in 1998. However, the extension of 
unemployment insurance is quite limited in practice. Eligibility is restricted to workers with 
a minimum of six months of employment. Most temporary and part-time workers in the 
informal labor market remain uninsured by unemployment insurance. The medical 
insurance system in Korea was established when the National Health Insurance Law was 
passed in 1999. The system was enacted with expansion to workplaces on July 1st, 2001. 
The system was characterized by low benefit coverage, where the out-of-pocket payment of 
nearly 35-40 percent of the incurred medical cost places a greater burden on low-wage 
earners in the informal labor market. Since many Korean workers in the informal labor 
market are hired on contracts, they must pay their own medical insurance fees, with no 
collaborative burden or contribution from the employers’ side. 
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As workers are attached to the same employer for a longer time, they accumulate 
more firm-specific skills. Thus, longer job tenure increases worker productivity and 
ultimately boosts workers’ wages. The age variable is connected closely not only to job 
tenure but also to labor market experience in general. The next variable used in the paper 
involves whether workers are members of labor unions. In the absence of unions, workers 
do not have any established mechanism for informing employers of complaints, wages in 
particular. As workers gather and organize into labor unions, they affect labor contracts 
and labor unions tend to increase the wages of union members (Freeman and Medoff 
1984).   
Finally, we include a gender variable since the data shows a wage differential 
between male and female workers even for those with similar human capital and other 
characteristics. Women generally tend to command lower wages than men, even though 
the degree of labor market discrimination varies depending on the country and company 
(Blau and Kahn 1996).  
As the most crucial variable, we employ the dummy variable to identify for 
formal and informal sectors, and compare the coefficient of informal sector between the 
cross-sectional wage regression and fixed effect estimation. This allows us to identify the 
penalty of being located in the informal labor market while maintaining the previously 
explained conditions. Additionally, in order to assess the possibility of different wage 
determination between gender groups, we estimated separate wage regressions for male 
and female workers respectively.   
 
3.4. Characteristics of variables 
 
Table 2 shows the sample means for some of the key variables from the final samples of  
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the KLIPS, depending on the sector. First of all, the wage differentials between informal 
and formal sectors as a whole are readily apparent. In terms of the average of log hourly 
earnings, workers in the informal sector tend to earn less than those in the formal sector 
by 0.48 log points. As mentioned previously, female workers are more likely to be 
informal, and this may result in substantial wage differences between sectors. The 
examination of sector wage differentials in different gender groups demonstrates that the 
wage differentials between sectors for male workers is 0.43 log points and the gap is 0.37 
log points for female workers. The raw wage differentials between the formal and 
informal sector appear to be higher for male workers than for female workers.    
Educational attainment by informal workers is quite a bit lower than that of 
formal workers. The average schooling time for formal workers is 13.2 years, but only 
11.3 years for informal workers. The different patterns in educational attainment also 
derive from female-intensive employment in the informal sector.11 Among male workers, 
the gap in years of education between the formal and informal sector is approximately 1.7 
years, and the gap is approximately 1.9 years for female workers. An obvious difference 
exists in the accumulation of human capital between the formal and informal sector. 
Next, workers in the informal sector are approximately two years older than the 
counterparts in the formal sector. Although there is no age gap between the formal and 
informal sectors among male workers, it is interesting to note that female workers in the 
informal sector are approximately 5 years older than those in the formal sector. We guess 
that female workers who re-entered labor market (probably due to childcare) are more 
likely to find jobs in the informal sector. In addition to age distribution, we note that 
                                                 
11 While the average schooling time among female workers is 12.1 years, it is 13.1 years for male 
workers. 
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workers in the formal sector are more likely to stay longer at their current job than 
informal sector workers. Considering that a substantial proportion of a worker’s wage is 
determined by the seniority-based wage system in the Korean labor market, the different 
patterns in current job tenure can be attributed to significant wage differentials between 
the formal and informal sector.12  The gap in job tenure between sectors for male workers 
is slightly higher than for female workers.  
In terms of union membership, only 3% of workers in the informal sector join 
unions, whereas approximately 33% of formal workers are union members. Considering 
that unions play an important role in increasing workers’ wages through collective 
bargaining, the scarce union membership of informal workers can be one of the reasons 
for the lower wages relative to those in the formal sector. This phenomenon can be 
explained in that the informal sector is more likely to be small firms and small firms are 
less likely to be unionized.  
We now examine the distributions of firm size, occupation, and industry 
depending on the sector. Those three characteristics are assumed to be important in 
determining workers’ wages, and there are marked differences between sectors in terms 
of those characteristics. First, we note that a significant proportion of informal workers 
belong to small firms (the size of workers is less than 10), and more than 60% of 
respondents in the informal sector work in small firms (see Table 3). However, among 
informal workers, less than 10% of respondents work in large firms (defined as firms 
with more than 300 workers). By way of contrast, among formal workers, more than 30% 
of individuals work in large firms and the proportion who work in small firms is only 
                                                 
12 See Cho and Cho (2008) for their international comparison of wage systems between the US 
and Korean labor markets. 
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13.7%. Most of the workers (about 80%) in the informal sector work in the firms with 
less than 10 employees. As small firms are less likely to provide workers with a variety 
of social insurances and tend to pay less compared to large firms, the different patterns in 
firm size between the formal and informal sector may be one of the reasons for the wage 
differentials between sectors. Even though distributions of firm size are not substantially 
different for male and female workers between the formal and informal sectors, female 
workers tend to work in smaller firms than their male counterparts. 
Next, we address the occupational distributions between formal and informal 
workers. As can be seen in Table 4, the sectors differ not only in the observed workers’ 
characteristics but also in the occupational composition of employment. Based on 9 one-
digit occupational classifications, individuals in the formal sector work in the occupations 
of administrative support (23.7%), technicians (17.5%), machine operators (15.1%), and 
professional specialty (13.3) in order of employment size. Among informal workers, the 
order is precision production (18.9%), laborers (16.4%), service (15.3%), and technicians 
(10.9%). Given that individuals in the laborer occupations earn much less than those in 
other occupations, the greater inclination of informal workers to work as laborers can 
provide one clue to the substantial wage gap of informal workers relative to the formal 
workers. Even though distributions in occupation do not differ substantially for male and 
female workers between the formal and informal sector, female workers tend to work in 
administrative occupations and male workers tend to work in blue collar occupations 
such as precision production and as machine operators. 
Finally, the distributions of industrial affiliations between formal and informal 
workers are shown in Table 5. Based on 9 one-digit industrial classifications, 
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manufacturing (34.1%) and educational and health service (19.5%) are identified as two 
major industries in which formal workers are employed. Among informal workers, 
manufacturing (21%) and trade (18.3%) are the two largest industries in terms of 
employment. Kruger and Summers (1988) argue that wage differences across industries 
are observed in the US labor market. However, in a recent study addressing the industry 
wage differentials in the Korean labor market, Cho (2008) has argued that it is difficult to 
determine industry wage differentials via panel analysis. Controlling for industry 
affiliations in the wage equations does not appear to change the effects of working in the 
informal sector on wages in the Korean labor market. This will be explained in the 
following sections. However, the industrial affiliations of workers definitely affect 
whether workers are covered by a variety of social insurance programs. For instance, 
among workers in the manufacturing industry, the proportion of informal workers is 
17.7%. By way of contrast, the proportion of informal workers is 39.7% for the trade 
industry, which is the second largest industry in terms of employment size for informal 
workers. The examination of industrial distributions by gender and sectors shows that 
female workers in the informal sector tend to work in hotels and restaurants and females 
in the formal sector are more likely to work in the manufacturing and educational and 
health service industries.  
 
4.  Estimation of gender gap between formal and informal markets 
 
4.1. Wage regression for each gender in formal and informal markets 
 
Basic evidence as to the existence of a dual labor market is related to the fact that formal 
and informal sectors may assign different prices to skills, thus generating different wage 
determination processes. Controlling for observed workers’ characteristics, we wish to 
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determine whether the returns to human capital (for example, returning to education) 
differ systematically between the formal and informal sectors for male and female groups. 
In an effort to assess the possibility of different wage determinations between gender 
groups, we estimated separate wage regressions for male and female workers respectively. 
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients from wage regressions between formal and 
informal sectors among gender groups. It is observed that returns to workers’ 
characteristics (related to the human capital components) differ significantly between 
formal and informal sectors, and this phenomenon exists for both male and female 
workers. The Chow tests reject the hypothesis of equality of all coefficients across sectors 
for both male and female workers.13  Therefore, we attempt to focus on the degree of dual 
labor market extent to which workers are paid differently between sectors among gender 
groups.  
As we can see in Table 6, an additional year of schooling increases workers’ 
earnings by approximately 5.7% for formal male workers, but increases the informal 
male workers’ earnings by approximately 3.8%, indicating a 1.9% point gap between 
sectors. The return to education is 6.0% for the formal female workers, but is only 2.7% 
for the female workers in the informal sector, showing a 3.3% point gap between sectors. 
This indicates that informal workers with the same level of education tend to command 
lower earnings than formal counterparts. Furthermore, based on the fact that the 
educational attainment gap of workers between formal and informal sectors is slightly 
higher among female workers (see Table 2), female workers in the informal sector might 
suffer from more disadvantages than observationally similar informal male workers. 
                                                 
13 The F-test statistic is 11.52 for male workers and 12.74 for female workers.  
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In addition to the different degree of return to education between gender groups, 
we can determine similar patterns of wage determination for other workers’ 
characteristics. For instance, whereas the effect of current job tenure on wages is slightly 
higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector among female workers, the effects 
are opposite for male workers. This can also lead to (higher) earnings differentials 
between formal and informal sectors among female workers as compared to male 
workers. The effect of union membership on wages reveals a similar direction, indicating 
a relatively higher union wage premium between formal and informal sectors in the 
female workers as compared to the male workers.  
The examination of coefficients from several occupational dummy variables in 
wage regressions shows how differently individuals’ occupations affect wages depending 
on sectors and gender.  For example, the coefficient of administrative occupation, in 
which formal female workers have the largest employment, is far higher in the formal 
sector than in the informal sector. This will broaden wage differentials between formal 
and informal sectors for female workers. By way of contrast, the effects of service 
occupation where informal female workers are largely employed do not differ greatly 
from the lowest paying occupation--laborers. However, formal female workers in the 
service occupation appear to command far higher earnings than female workers in the 
same occupation. This also results in a broadening of wage differentials between sectors 
among female workers due to different wage premiums for service occupations.  
Our analysis reveals that while dualism appears to exist in the Korean labor 
market between the formal and informal sectors for both male and female workers, the 
characteristics of the dual labor market are shown to be much more severe among female 
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workers. In terms of wage determination, where major human capital components are 
rewarded in the labor market, we determined that the price gap between sectors is far 
higher among female groups as compared to male workers. We speculate that the 
different severities of the dual labor market between gender groups helps to explain the 
gender differences in the estimated wage differentials between formal and informal 
sectors. This can be more formally tested by adopting the fixed effect model.  
 
4.2. Comparison of cross-sectional wage regression and fixed effect estimation 
 
We present empirical results from both the cross-sectional estimation and fixed-effect 
model of the wage equation. The empirical strategy is to control as well as possible for 
any factors that determine workers’ wages, and then to analyze the effects of informal 
sector dummy variables on workers’ wages. Traditional human capital and demographic 
variables – education, labor market experience, sex, marital status, and location of 
residence are employed as explanatory variables. Along with those variables, occupation 
and industry dummy variables at the one-digit level are included in the regression 
analysis.  Additionally, other important factors determining workers’ wages such as 
tenure at the current job, union status, and firm size are also controlled. 
Table 7 shows the empirical results from both cross-sectional OLS and fixed-
effect estimations for the whole samples of workers. All of the explanatory variables are 
included in the wage equation, and the coefficients of each explanatory variable are as 
expected in their respective directions. For example, an additional one year of schooling 
increases workers’ wages by 4.8 percent, but is reduced to 1.5 percent in the fixed effect 
model. This indicates that more able persons tend to accumulate higher education, and 
this self-selection effect appears to overestimate the role of human capital in the OLS 
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wage equation.  We also detected similar patterns from the estimated coefficients of 
tenure and union by comparing the OLS and FE results. This reveals a possible positive 
correlation between unobserved workers’ characteristics and their decision as to whether 
or not they stay with the same employer and participate in labor unions.  This pattern is 
consistent with the results of previous studies that show a substantial drop in the 
estimated coefficients in the fixed-effect models (e.g. Solon 1988).    
According to the results from cross-sectional estimation, workers in the informal 
sector earn approximately 9.7% less than workers in the formal sector, after controlling 
for observed workers’ characteristics. Other explanatory variables have the following 
effects on wages.14 An additional one year of schooling and job tenure tend to increase 
workers’ wages by 4.8% and 2.2%, respectively. Workers’ age appears to exert a 
negligible effect on wages. If workers are union members, their earnings are higher than 
non-union members by approximately 5.8%.15  In terms of the gender earnings gap, 
female workers tend to earn less than male counterparts by approximately 27.9%, even 
after allowing for a vector of characteristics that affects wage levels.  
The coefficient of the informal sector in the cross-sectional wage regression can 
be overestimated if individuals with higher productivities systematically choose jobs in 
the formal sector. Our expectation seems to be supported, since the size of the estimated 
                                                 
14 Including firm size variables seems to affect the size of the estimated coefficients of the 
informal sector dummy variable in the cross-sectional regression. When we drop the firm 
size variable, the estimated coefficient of informal sector dummy variable rises to -12.5%. 
15 While not shown in this paper, the inclusion of firm size dummy variables hugely affects the 
size of the union dummy variable. If we drop the firm size variable in the cross-sectional 
regression, the effect on union members’ wages will increase to 13.6%. Therefore, it is 
evident that in order to correctly measure the union effect on wages, one should also 
consider the effects of firm size. The effect of firm size on wages varies depending on the 
firm size. Compared to small firms that employ less than 10 workers, the wage premiums 
for individuals who work in the medium and large firms range from 5.9% to 25.0%.   
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coefficient of informal sector dummy variable is reduced substantially in the fixed effects 
estimation. The estimated wage differential between formal and informal workers is now 
shown to be 4.8%, indicating a 61.6% decrease in the size of the estimated coefficient. 
Therefore, there is a possibility of systematic sorting between formal and informal sectors 
according to unobserved workers’ abilities. Based on the results from fixed-effect 
estimations, there appears to be a negative correlation between workers’ abilities (or 
productivities) and inclusion in the informal sector. Among other coefficients of 
explanatory variables, one thing to note is the change in union dummy coefficients. 
Contrary to the huge effect of union member on wages in the cross-sectional estimation, 
the union wage premium is reduced substantially, to 3.2%. This empirical finding also 
suggests that workers with relatively higher abilities tend to choose unionized firms and 
they join union members and command higher wages. 
The wage differentials between workers in the formal and informal sectors can 
differ among gender groups. The estimates of wage differentials for both male and female 
workers are shown in Table 8. Along with the results from Table 7, all explanatory 
variables are controlled for the estimations of wage regression. According to the results 
of cross-sectional estimation, male workers in the informal sector earn less than those in 
the formal sector by approximately 8.4%, which is slightly lower than the results from the 
entire sample of workers. However, according to the results of the fixed effects model, 
we are unable to find wage differentials of male workers between the informal and formal 
sectors; this is a very notable result. The estimated coefficient of the informal dummy 
variable is -0.02, which is no longer statistically significant. 
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Among female workers, the estimated wage differential between the formal and 
informal sector was 9.5% in the cross-sectional analysis. In contrast to the results 
obtained with male workers, the wage gap between the formal and informal sector still 
exists in the fixed effect estimation, even though the coefficient size was reduced. The 
female workers in the informal sector earn approximately 6.4% less than those in the 
formal sector when we allow for the (time consistent) unobserved workers’ 
characteristics. The observed wage differentials for the whole samples are, therefore, 
apparently driven by the wage differentials from the female workers.  
In the case of multiple regressions, we implicitly impose the homoskedasticity 
condition indicating that the variance of the unobserved error conditional on the 
explanatory variable is constant. However, we usually have to consider the failure of 
homoskedasticity (i.e. heteroskedasticity). In our empirical results shown in Table 7 and 
8,    we constructed robust consistent standard errors for both OLS and FE estimates. In 
accordance with the study conducted by White (1980), we employ residuals from the 
initial wage regressions on explanatory variables and then adjust them by multiplying the 
variance between each level of variable and the average of variables. This method is 
widely employed as a robustness check. The following subsection also describes the 
possible selection issue associated with FE estimates, and we were able to produce 
somewhat robust empirical results relative to other previous studies. 
According to our test of the existence of a dual labor market shown in the 
previous section, we determined that dualism differently affects each gender. This section 
formally demonstrates that this dual labor market structure penalizes women more than 
male workers. This also implies that policies designed to reduce the gender earning gap 
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alone may be ineffective if the crucial part of the gender earning gap, which can be 
attributed to the sizable wage penalty imposed on women working in the informal labor 
market, remains untendered. 
 
4.3. Further issue on fixed effect estimation  
 
As the fixed-effect estimates are implemented empirically for job movers, the samples 
should contain enough job movers who move from the informal to the formal sector and 
move from formal to informal. It is difficult to obtain accurate fixed-effect estimates if 
the sectoral movement occurs only in one direction such as job movement from the 
formal to formal sector or from the informal to informal sector. Table 9 shows the 
mobility patterns of workers between the formal and informal sectors. Among the 18,816 
observations used in this paper, there were 2,593 samples that moved jobs during the 
studied time period.16 Among all formal workers who changed their jobs, approximately 
78% of workers find new jobs that also offer some type of social security insurance. In 
other words, the majority of formal workers succeed in finding new jobs in the formal 
sector. However, only about 22% of formal workers move into new jobs in the informal 
sector.17 Among the 1,231 samples of informal workers in their previous jobs, about 42% 
of workers move into the formal sector. Although more than half of formal workers in 
their previous jobs also find new jobs in the formal sectors, there is quite a large 
proportion of formal workers who move into informal sectors. Additionally, almost half 
of informal workers move into new jobs in the formal sectors. Even though some 
tendency was noted, particularly for workers who change from the formal sector, to 
                                                 
16 There are very few samples that reported a change of sectors but did not change their jobs. We 
do not consider these as job changers. 
17 While it is not proven by data, we guess that job changers citing involuntary reasons such as 
plant closing might tend to work at new informal sector jobs.  
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maintain the same sectors after job changes, there appear to be enough samples of 
individuals who change sectors either from formal to informal, or informal to formal 
sectors. 
The job mobility pattern between the formal and informal sectors does not appear 
to differ substantially among gender groups. Among male workers who changed their 
jobs from the informal sector, almost half of male workers find new jobs that offer some 
type of social security insurance. According to this finding, it is difficult to assert that 
there is an obstacle for male workers to move into the formal sector from the informal 
sector. Among male workers in their previous formal jobs, approximately 80% of 
workers succeed in finding new jobs in the formal sector.  Even though there is some 
difference in terms of the proportions of people moving into new jobs in the formal sector, 
we detect similar patterns of job mobility among female workers. Among female workers 
who changed their jobs from the informal sector, approximately 38% of female workers 
move into new jobs in the formal sector. Similar to male workers, most formal female 
workers find new jobs in the formal sector. Therefore, based on the pattern of job 
movement between formal and informal sectors in the Korean labor market, it is difficult 
to assert that there exist substantial barriers for informal workers to enter into the formal 
sector.  
Next, we must explore the possible problem of the endogenous mobility of 
workers that may force fixed effects estimators to be inconsistent. Longitudinal analysis 
solves the potential bias problem of unmeasured workers’ characteristics in the cross-
sectional regression, but might result in another potential bias (Solon 1988). This bias 
includes the selectivity of job switchers. As noted, most job changes tend to be voluntary 
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and, as a result, the identification of informal sector effects on wages in fixed-effects 
estimations depends principally on the wage changes experienced by job changers, which 
may induce a self-selection problem. Additionally, job changers who also change sectors 
are included only for the analysis of the fixed effects estimations. As a consequence, 
workers who change jobs but maintain the same sector affiliations are excluded from the 
samples of sector changers. Therefore, this may cause the fixed effects estimates of wage 
differentials across sectors to evidence a downward bias if the wages of job changers who 
stay in the same sectors relatively increase compared to an increase in the wages of job 
changers who change sectors. 
Table 10 represents wage changes following job changes for each group of sector 
holders, and for sector changers after job changes for the whole samples. While the 
hourly wages of sector holders increased by 0.09 log points after job changes, the wages 
of sector changers increased by 0.11 log points. Given that the current job tenures of 
sector changers are slightly longer than those of sector holders, wage increases after a job 
change do not differ significantly between sector holders and changers.18 It is, therefore, 
difficult to believe that the samples of job changers holding the same sectors cause the 
fixed effects estimator to be inconsistent. The examination of wage changes between 
sector holders and sector changers shows no different pattern between male and female 
workers. The wage changes between sector holders and sector changers are the same 
regardless of gender groups. Therefore, the different patterns of estimated wage 
differentials between sectors for male and female workers also do not appear to be driven 
by different wage changes due to job changes. 
                                                 
18 The higher current job tenures for sector changers might have produced slightly higher wage 
increases compared to the sector holders having relatively lower job tenures. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The structure of the formal and informal labor markets is related closely to the gender 
group in the labor market, even if it has not been seriously considered in the previous 
analysis. Unlike previous studies focusing either on market structures or the gender 
earnings gap alone, this study considers market structure as a more crucial factor in 
determining the gender earning gap. In order to assess the manner in which the structure 
of the labor market affects the gender earning gap, this study incorporates a two-sector 
model of the formal and informal labor market, and estimates the wage differentials in 
each labor market focusing on the gender groups. We employed the prevailing criteria for 
the formal/informal labor market with regard to whether workers are covered by any 
social security system. For our analysis, we adopt the Korean case because the Korean 
labor market has a prominent feature of a dual formal and informal labor market and also 
the gender earning gap is relatively high among OECD countries.  
This study, which utilizes panel data, analyzes the differences in wages between 
the formal and informal sector by using fixed-effects models that allow us to overcome 
the possible endogenous problems associated with cross-sectional analysis. The estimated 
wage differentials between sectors from fixed-effects models show a substantial drop in 
the size of wage gaps, indicating systematic sorting between formal and informal sectors 
by unobserved workers’ abilities. More interestingly, the wage differentials between 
workers in the formal and informal sectors are shown to differ among gender groups. 
While estimated wage differentials from cross-sectional analysis between formal and 
informal sectors among male workers disappear in the fixed-effect estimations, the wage 
gap between formal and informal sectors among female workers still exists in the fixed 
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effect estimation, even though the coefficient size was decreased. The observed wage 
differentials for the whole samples, therefore, appear to be driven by the wage 
differentials from the female workers.  
As a robustness issue for the fixed effect model, we evaluate wage changes 
between sector holders and sector changers. They do not provide significantly different 
patterns for male and female workers. Therefore, the different patterns of estimated wage 
differentials between sectors for male and female workers do not appear to be driven by 
the potential bias that might derive from fixed-effects estimates.  
According to our tests of the existence of dual labor markets, dualism appears to 
affect each gender differently. The dual structure of the labor market seems to aggravate 
the overall gender earning gap, as female workers are penalized more by locating 
themselves in the informal labor market than are male workers.  
Under circumstances of different severities in the dual labor market between 
gender groups, policies intended to reduce only the gender earning gap may prove 
ineffective. In many countries with the dual labor market structures like Korea, market 
structure-ignorant policies tend to tender women in the formal labor market, but their 
impacts may only very rarely affect women in the informal labor market. These policies 
may even exacerbate the inequality in working conditions of women in the formal and 
informal labor markets. The crucial part of the gender earning gap attributed to the 
sizable wage penalty imposed on women working in the informal labor market may 
remain untendered by those policies. Therefore, the matrix policy of simultaneously 
considering the market structure and gender issues (i.e. male in formal and in informal, 
female in formal and informal) should be considered. Policies addressing the gender 
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earning gap caused interactively by the dualism of labor market structure and gender 
discrimination, and thereby targeting the improvement of female working conditions in 
the informal labor market, may prove to be a more effective remedy, particularly in 
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Table 1: Proportions of informal sector 
 Total Male Female 
Formal 75 81.9 63.6 
Informal 25 18.1 36.4 
Notes: The informal sectors cover workers who are covered at least by one of three social security 
system prevalent in Korea. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Means) 
 
Whole Samples Male Female 
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Log of hourly wages 4.31 3.83 4.45 4.02 4.05 3.68 
Female 0.32 0.55     
Education (yrs) 13.2 11.31 13.45 11.74 12.83 10.96 
Age 37.4 39.1 38.88 38.99 34.19 39.25 
Job tenure 6.8 3.2 7.64 3.76 5.04 2.70 
Union 0.33 0.03 0.35 0.03 0.26 0.03 
Married 0.42 0.46 0.35 0.45 0.56 0.47 
sample size 14,106 4,712 9,547 2,107 4,559 2,605 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to full-time workers and 
non-agricultural sector workers aged 20-65. Hourly earnings have been calculated and the details 
are shown in the text. The bottom 1% of salary workers was excluded.  
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of firm size by sectors and gender 
Firm size 
Whole Samples Male Female 
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
less than10 13.7 61.5 11.6 61.5 17.7 60.3 
10~29 17.6 17.8 17.2 21.1 17.9 15.2 
30~99 20.7 8.0 20.4 8.2 21.7 8.3 
100~299 13.3 3.0 14.0 3.0 12.4 3.4 
300~999 10.4 2.4 10.4 1.9 10.6 2.9 






Table 4: Occupational distribution by sectors and gender 
Occupation 
Whole Samples Male Female 
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Administrative and 
managerial 1.5 0.8 2.1 1.7 0.1 0.0 
Professional specialty 13.3 6.3 10.5 4.7 19.1 7.7 
Technicians and 
related support 17.5 10.9 20.2 10.5 11.9 11.2 
Administrative 
support 23.7 9.9 18.3 8.0 34.9 11.4 
Service 3.9 15.3 3.1 5.6 5.6 23.2 
Sales 3.8 13.0 3.5 9.5 4.5 15.9 
Precision production, 
craft, and repair 15.0 18.9 18.0 29.3 8.8 10.4 
Machine operators 
and assemblers 15.1 8.5 18.2 12.1 8.7 5.6 
Laborers 6.2 16.4 6.1 18.7 6.4 14.7 
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Table 5: Industrial distribution by sectors and gender 
Industry 
Whole Samples Male Female 
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Mining and 
Construction 6.2 11.0 8.4 22.8 1.5 1.4 
Manufacturing 34.1 21.0 36.3 22.9 29.4 19.5 
Trans, comms, and 
public utilities 9.2 3.2 11.1 5.3 5.3 1.5 
Trade (retail and 
wholesale) 9.3 18.3 8.8 17.1 10.4 19.3 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.6 13.3 1.0 5.1 2.9 20.0 
Financial, insurance, 
and real estate 6.5 6.1 6.0 4.8 7.5 7.2 
Educational and health 
services 19.5 11.6 14.2 7.4 30.4 14.9 
Professional services 9.4 5.5 9.4 5.4 9.6 5.6 




Table 6: Wage determination by sector and gender 
  Male Female 
  Formal Informal Formal Informal 































































































industry yes Yes yes yes 
firm size yes Yes yes yes 
time effect yes Yes yes yes 
R-sqs 0.5374 0.3037 0.6219 0.3859 
observation 9,544 2,106 4,556 2,605 
Notes: The laborers are the omitted occupation and 8 industry dummy variables are included. 6 
firm size dummy variables are also controlled for. The numbers in parentheses are 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 
** significant at 1%  * significant at 5%  
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Table 7: Estimates of wage differentials between formal and informal sector   
Notes: 9 occupation and 8 industry dummy variables are included. 6 firm size dummy variables 
are also controlled for. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors both for OLS and FE estimates. 
 
** significant at 1%  * significant at 5% 
 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
Informal -0.097** (0.008) 
-0.048** 
(0.009) 
education (yrs) 0.048** (0.001) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
Age 0.003** 0.000  
Tenure 0.022** (0.001) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Female -0.280** (0.006)  
Union 0.058** (0.008) 
0.032** 
(0.008) 
Married 0.119** (0.007) 
0.034** 
(0.008) 
time effect yes yes 
Occupation yes yes 
Industry yes yes 
firm size yes yes 
R-sqs 0.6091 0.4219 
Observation 18,811 18,811 
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Table 8: Estimates of wage differentials between formal and informal sector by gender 
Notes: 9 occupation and 8 industry dummy variables are included. 6 firm size dummy variables 
are also controlled for. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors both for OLS and FE estimates. 
 
** significant at 1%  * significant at 5% 
 
Male Samples Female Samples 
OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect 








































time effect yes yes yes yes 
Occupation yes yes yes yes 
Industry yes yes yes yes 
firm size yes yes yes yes 
R-sqs 0.5355 0.3929 0.5924 0.443 
Observation 11,650 11,650 7,161 7,161 
36 
Table 9: Job movement between formal and informal sectors 
 
Whole Samples 
formal informal total 
formal 1,062 300 1,362 
informal 519 712 1,231 
total 1,581 1,012 2,593 
Notes: Sectors shown in the rows are those from the previous jobs and sectors in the columns are 





formal informal total formal informal total 
formal 699 179 878 363 121 484 
informal 256 279 535 263 433 696 
total 955 458 1,413 626 554 1,180 
Notes: Sectors shown in the rows are those from the previous jobs and sectors in the columns are 
taken from the current jobs. 
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Table 10: Wage changes from sector holders and sector changers  
 Sector holders Sector changers 
Wages before job changes 3.96 (0.51) 
3.79 
(0.40) 
Wages after job changes 4.06 (0.52) 
3.90 
(0.43) 
Wage changes 0.09 (0.37) 
0.11 
(0.43) 
Job tenure at current jobs 1.67 (1.05) 
1.82 
(1.14) 
sample size 1,774 819 












































sample size 978 435 796 384 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
 
